SCOTT SIMON, HOST:
Now to the Middle East, where U.S. Secretary of State Blinken has said he is hopeful that the latest round of negotiations between Israel and Hamas can lead to a ceasefire. For more than a year, of course, the Biden administration has been pushing for a deal that would free the remaining Israeli hostages and end the war in Gaza. Natan Sachs is director of the Center for Middle East policy at the Brookings Institution. Mr. Sachs, thanks for being back with us.
NATAN SACHS: My pleasure. Thank you.
SIMON: There have been so many failed hopes when it comes to these negotiations. From Israel's point of view, why might Prime Minister Netanyahu be more amenable to a deal now?
SACHS: There have been many failed hopes. There are some differences now, and two in particular. One is that Israel has had a string of remarkable successes and some good luck in its fight with the broader Iranian-backed Axis in the region. The decimation of Hamas, of course, but also the serious deliberate - the defanging of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and of course, the fall of the Assad regime, a close ally of Iran.
And this gives Netanyahu a lot of political headwind and almost a sense of euphoria, in that realm, at least. The other variable is, of course, Donald Trump. We have a new president coming in. Netanyahu and others are very keen to curry favor with him, to make sure they're on the good side. And that would lend toward ending this, or at least ending this phase, before Trump enters the White House.
SIMON: I have all this time recalled our conversation with you on October 7, the day of the Hamas attacks, and you described that day as Israel's 9/11. Do you believe Israel is stronger and safer than it was 14 months ago?
SACHS: I remember that call, of course. It was a horrific day and the answer is very conflicted. Israel in some ways is much stronger. As I just described, its main regional foe, Iran, has taken a huge hit. In that regard, the Hamas attack backfired spectacularly. Its allies, the whole array of backers, has really been hit terribly. But Israel is also suffering and much weaker in other ways, domestically and in terms of international prestige.
Its prime minister is not traveling this week to Poland because he's afraid of being arrested. There's an arrest warrant for him out from the Hague. And, of course, domestically, the polarization that Israel has felt for several years, and especially since January 2023, is only worse now, despite the war. And as I said, internationally, if you look at public opinion, at the strategic standing of Israel, the way general publics who are not keenly involved with the issue look at Israel, it's in a very different position than it was, and much for the worse.
It doesn't mean policy in the short term. Trump is coming in. He's very pro-Israel, but public opinion is very different.
SIMON: Let me get you to talk about some of the internal political divisions in Israel, 'cause I gather you were there recently. How do they play out? And what might they be - how might they be part of what has to be decided this time?
SACHS: Well, Israeli politics for quite a while now have not really been about right or left. They have been about Netanyahu or not Netanyahu - and Bibi, anti-Bibi, as it's called - in Israel. And in that regard, that's only intensified. Netanyahu after October 7, I kept being asked, will Netanyahu stay in office, or how long will he stay in office? And here he is looking perhaps to complete his term and stay until 2026 - leave in 2026.
SIMON: We should remind people, there are a lot of people questioning why Israel seemed to be so unprepared for that attack on October 7.
SACHS: Absolutely. 9/11 understates, perhaps, the domestic failure. 9/11 was, of course, a surprise for the United States and an intelligence failure, but October 7 was a colossal intelligence failure and a failure of preparedness. And Israelis were irate at their own authorities and looking for who is responsible. The ultimate person responsible, of course, is Prime Minister Netanyahu. And yet he's still in office.
And so there's deep division. He is underwater in the polls. There's a majority against him. But nonetheless, there's not a clear majority for anyone else. And so even if elections were held today, it's not completely clear that he would lose. But the feelings about him have only intensified - extreme support and extreme antagonism. I'd add to that, that before October 7, Israel was already roiled with demonstrations and deep, deep division over a government attempt to overhaul the judicial system and, in my mind, to undermine democratic institutions in Israel.
That abated for a while after October 7 as the war began. Now it's being resumed, and it's being resumed with a vengeance and with some impunity because the Israeli public is so tired and so weary of demonstrations and also occupied by its own troubles that Netanyahu's government is pushing forward with some of these things quite dramatically. So domestically speaking, Israel is in a worse shape, and I would say significantly so.
SIMON: In the minute we have left, Mr. Sachs, there's - so much has changed just in the past few weeks, for example, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. What do you have your eye on as to what could happen next in the region?
SACHS: Well, there are many variables going on, of course. Israel is watching Syria. It's watching the Houthis, who have struck successfully in Israel just recently. The grand bargain still remains. And that's the question of whether Israel and Saudi Arabia could perhaps move towards normalization, expanding the Abraham Accords between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and others, which were part of the legacy of the first Trump administration.
I imagine the Trump administration will be keen on doing this. It is not simple. The big question is, what is the Palestinian component there? And will we see, of course, a ceasefire that also allows for reconstruction - much, much needed relief and reconstruction, in the Gaza Strip and on the Israeli side of the border?
SIMON: And in a half a minute we have left, has the world been reminded that there is no permanent - even semipermanent - solution without a Palestinian contribution?
SACHS: That's right. There's no solution. But on the other hand, many of these parties are keen to move forward even without a perfect solution to the Palestinian question. So from their perspective, perhaps a cynical one, they want to find the formula that allows them to move forward, gives the minimum necessary on the Palestinian issue, but allows them to pursue other interests that have nothing to do with the Palestinians on Iran and elsewhere.
SIMON: Natan Sachs at the Brookings Institution, thank you so much for being with us.
SACHS: Thank you. Transcript provided by NPR, Copyright NPR.
NPR transcripts are created on a rush deadline by an NPR contractor. This text may not be in its final form and may be updated or revised in the future. Accuracy and availability may vary. The authoritative record of NPR’s programming is the audio record.
